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THE ULTIMATE FIGHTING
CHAMPIONSHIP AND ZUFFA: FROM
‘HUMAN COCK-FIGHTING’ TO
MARKET POWER
CARL J. GAUL IV*
The Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”) is the premier mixed
martial arts (“MMA”) promotion in the world and is the most recent athletic
organization to attain a dominant market share that arguably constitutes a
monopoly or monopsony. Antitrust law prohibits organizations from
restraining trade or intentionally stamping out market place competition to
attain or maintain monopoly power. The UFC’s behavior has raised
significant concerns about competition in two separate markets: the MMA
Promotional Market and Elite MMA Labor Market. While the MMA
Promotional Market appears more competitive than it has ever been, the Elite
MMA Labor Market has seen significant reductions in competition. This
reduction in competition has left MMA fighters vulnerable to exploitation
and coercion. Without some regulatory oversight and with major gaps in
relevant legislation, the fighters are left with few choices.
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INTRODUCTION
Mixed martial arts (“MMA”) has grown faster than any sport in the world
for the last twenty-five years.1 From brutal beginnings with almost no rules
or regulations to a mainstream sport captivating millions of fans and earning
billions of dollars, the MMA community is facing one problem common to
every sport in its early days, a single economic entity dominating market
place competition.2 The Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”) emerged
as the first major MMA promotion and has been the driving force behind the
growth of the sport as a whole.3 As a result, the UFC and its former parent
company, Zuffa, LLC (“Zuffa”),4 have grown to be the most powerful
organization in the MMA industry, having achieved what can only be
described as market dominance.5 The association of the sport with the
organization is so prevalent that many consumers confuse the organization
1. Derek Bolender, MMA: Get to Know the Fastest Growing Sport in America,
BLEACHER REP. (June 4, 2008), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/27230-mma-get-toknow-the-fastest-growing-sport-in-america; Daniel Schorn, Mixed Martial Arts: A New
Kind of Fight, CBS NEWS (Dec. 10, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mixedmartial-arts-a-new-kind-of-fight/.
2. Paul Gift, Former FTC Commissioner: UFC Investigations, Antitrust Lawsuit
‘Ultimately About Consumers’, SBNATION (Apr. 12, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.bloo
dyelbow.com/2016/4/12/11404276/former-commissioner-joshua-wright-ftc-investiga
tion-antitrust-lawsuit-ufc-news; see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998);
Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 207–08 (1922); Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
3. Andrew Binner, The Rise of Mixed Martial Arts, AL–JAZEERA (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/sport/othersports/2014/04/rise-mixed-martial-arts201441094427103582.html.
4. Darren Rovell & Brett Okamoto, Dana White on $4 billion UFC Sale: ‘Sport Is
Going to the Next Level, ESPN (July 11, 2016), http://www.espn.com/mma/story
/_/id/16970360/ufc-sold-unprecedented-4-billion-dana-white-confirms (explaining that
Zuffa recently sold a majority share in the UFC. This sale does not affect the overall
analysis of this comment).
5. Greg Byron, Industry Dominance: The UFC and its ‘Monopoly’ in the MMA
Market, MMA CORNER (Jan. 24, 2014), http://themmacorner.com/2014/01/24/industrydominance-the-ufc-and-its-monopoly-in-the-mma-market/; see also Am. Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 792–95 (1946) (analyzing the degree of market control
necessary to achieve market dominance).
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with the sport itself; the UFC is synonymous with MMA the way “Kleenex”
is synonymous with “tissue.”6
The UFC formed in November 1993 and quickly became a political
pariah.7 Senator John McCain described mixed martial arts as “human cock–
fighting”8 and led a successful campaign against the sport, forcing it into
temporary anonymity.9 When the UFC returned to the public eye, it was a
regulated, professional, and respectable sport.10
The UFC’s market success began after it was purchased by Zuffa in
January 2001.11 Between 2001 and 2010, the UFC’s viewership increased
exponentially, due in large part to the more than tripling number of pay–per–
view events produced annually and effective marketing.12 The UFC then
entered deals with Spike TV and Fox Sports, which further expanded the
UFC and MMA consumer base.13 Zuffa then bought out the UFC’s five top
competitors14 leaving only small competitors, all with hardly a fraction of
Zuffa’s market share.15

6. Martin Rogers, UFC Sold to WME–IMG for $4 Billion; Dana White Will Still
Run Day–to–Day Operations, USA TODAY (July 11, 2016), http://www.usatoday
.com/story/sports/ufc/2016/07/11/ufc-sale-wwe-img-dana-white/86937834/
(quoting
UFC president Dana White confusing the organization for the sport itself, “no other sport
compares to UFC”).
7. See Amy Silverman, John McCain Breaks Up a Fight, PHX. NEW TIMES (Feb.
12, 1998), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/john-mccain-breaks-up-a-fight-642
2460.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 13:46–24A.01–.17, 13:46–24B.1–.5 (2010);
Adam Hill, A Timeline of UFC Rules: From No–Holds–Barred to Highly Regulated,
BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 24, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1614213-a-timelineof-ufc-rules-from-no-holds-barred-to-highly-regulated# (detailing the MMA comm
unity’s regulatory response to John McCain’s crusade against “human cock–fighting”).
11. Matthew Miller, Ultimate Cash Machine, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2008), https://ww
w.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0505/080.html (detailing the market success and revenue
growth following Zuffa’s purchase of the UFC).
12. Kelefa Sanneh, Ultimate Fighting Versus Boxing, NEW YORKER (May 22, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/ultimate-fighting-versus-box i ng.
13. Michael David Smith, Spike TV Says Goodbye to the UFC, MMA FIGHTING
(Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.mmafighting.com/2011/08/18/spike-tv-says-goodbye-tothe-ufc#2912082.
14. Chris Harty, 5 MMA Organizations Bought Out by UFC, RICHEST (Jan. 16,
2016), http://www.therichest.com/sports/mma-sports/5-mma-organizations-bought-outby-ufc/ (detailing Zuffa’s purchases of the World Fighting Alliance, World Extreme
Cagefighting, Pride Fighting Championship, International Fight League, and Strike
force).
15. Dave Doyle, Is Bellator a Real Rival to the UFC?, MMA FIGHTING (Nov. 8,
2013), http://www.mmafighting.com/2013/11/8/5079324/fightweets-is-bellator-a-realrival-to-the-ufc.
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Through business expertise and acquisitions, Zuffa gained control of at
least 90% of the MMA Promotional Market and more than 60% of the Elite
MMA Labor Market.16 While this market dominance is an impressive feat
of business expertise, it raises concerns about potential antitrust violations.17
Zuffa’s market dominance is at least partially the result of eliminating
competition through mergers and acquisitions supplemented by stringent
non–compete agreements preventing fighters from participating in other
promotions.18 While these transactions are not per se illegal, such business
practices become illegal when their result or purpose is to restrain trade or
suppress competition.19 And, although antitrust law has been applied
unevenly in the world of professional athletics,20 it is clear that exercising
market power in a way that harms competition is illegal. 21
Firms with market power maintain their dominance by preventing new
competitors from entering the market, or by constructing barriers to market
entry, and market power presents the opportunity for firms to raise prices
such that consumers are forced to pay more than they would in a competitive
market.22 These business practices destroy the “potentiality of competition”
and are the exact kind of practices prohibited by the Sherman Antitrust Act
(“Sherman Act”).23 The simplest example of this business practice is
anticompetitive monopolization that creates or maintains barriers to market
entry. A monopoly occurs when a single company controls all or nearly all
of the market for a given type of product or service, dominating the market.24
As a result, the dominant firm has no incentive to set competitive prices,
improve products, or produce at a competitive level because consumers have
no substitute seller to buy from.25
A monopsony is the mirror image of a monopoly––where monopoly is the
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra, Figures 1, 2, 3, & 4.
Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
Byron, supra note 5.
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Am. Tobacco Co., 328
U.S. 781, 810.
20. Compare Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), with Fed. Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 218 (1922).
21. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976).
22. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory
in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 355 (1989).
23. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 74 (1911).
24. May, supra note 22, at 266.
25. John D. Culbertson & Roy Weinstein, Antitrust Aspects of Barriers to Entry, in
UCLA LAW FIRST ANNUAL INST. ON US AND EU ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS (2004); Shuntian Yao & Lydia Gan, Monopoly Innovation and Welfare
Effects, ECONS. (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.economics-ejournal.org/econom
ics/discussionpapers/2010-10/file.
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domination of a market on the selling side, a monopsony is the domination
of a market on the buying side.26 Monopsony occurs when there is a single
buyer of a product or service.27 While different in structure, monopoly and
monopsony create the same distortion of economic competition.28 Market
entry becomes impossible when a business dominates the market for an
essential product input and prevents the input producers from selling to other
businesses.29 Specialized, non–unionized laborers are uniquely vulnerable
to monopsonies because their performance and work are product inputs and
individual laborers do not have bargaining power comparable to a large
business.30
In 1890, Congress began to address the issue of dominant firms exercising
market power by passing the Sherman Act31 to prevent anticompetitive
business practices that restrain trade or result in monopolization.32 The
Sherman Act was a response to a small number of businessmen dominating
markets, not through superior skill and effective business, but by “the use of
means which made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair
competition.”33 Such practices were viewed as economically destructive.34
Consequently, the Sherman Act section 1 prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of

26. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Jonathon M. Jacobson, Monopsony 2013: Still Not Truly
Symmetric, ANTITRUSTSOURCE (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.wsgr.com/attorneys/BIOS
/PDFs/jacobson-0413.pdf.
27. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2002) (defining a
monopoly as “the power to pay lower than competitive wages for the services being
acquired without having the sellers of those services –– the players –– turn to another
league or team for employment”); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907 F.2d 510, 514
(5th Cir. 1990) (“[M]onopoly is the term used to describe the situation where there is
only one seller of a product, monopsony where there is only one buyer . . . .”) (quoting
R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER
MATERIALS 148 (2d ed. 1981)).
28. Vogel v. Am. Soc’y Of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984) (equating
Sherman Act violations of monopoly and monopsony in that “[j]ust as a sellers’ cartel
enables the charging of monopoly prices, a buyers’ cartel enables the charging of
monopsony prices; and a monopoly and monopsony are symmetrical distortions of
competition from an economic standpoint”).
29. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 294, 295–96, 305–06
(1949) (affirming an injunction to keep Standard Oil Co., the largest seller of oil gasoline
in the area, from enforcing or entering exclusive supply contracts with any independent
dealer in petroleum products and automobile accessories).
30. Jacobson, supra note 26, at 6.
31. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
32. May, supra note 22, at 292–96.
33. 21 CONG. REC. S3152 (Apr. 8, 1890) (statement by Rep. Hoar).
34. Id.
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trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”35
Section 2 outlaws the acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power.36 It
is not illegal to acquire monopoly power, but it is illegal to do so by
intentionally eliminating competition or preventing competitors from
entering the market.37
Application of antitrust law to sports has been, at best, inconsistent.38
While baseball has been largely exempted from antitrust law,39 every other
sport and league is subject to every facet of antitrust law. There has not yet
been a ruling on antitrust law in regards to MMA.
This Comment will explore the antitrust implications of Zuffa and the
UFC’s business practices from 2001-2015. Section II of this Comment will
focus on the antitrust laws, their purpose, and application to various business
practices. It will also explain Zuffa and the UFC’s industry dominance and
business practices. Section III will apply antitrust law to Zuffa’s business
practices, the MMA Promotional Market, and the Elite MMA Labor Market.
Section IV will recommend two specific changes necessary to stop injurious
behavior in the MMA industry: acquisition of collective bargaining power
by the fighters through an athletes association or union and expansion of the
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act to MMA.

35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see May, supra note 22, at 265 (addressing the extensive
debate over the legislative intent behind the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton
Antitrust Act as to whether the intention was consumer welfare or anti-cartelization);
FTC & DOJ, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 3
(2000).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
37. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)) (explaining that illegal
monopolization has two elements: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power”).
38. Compare Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (reversing judgment for
defendants because “the volume of interstate business involved in organized professional
football places it within the provisions of the antitrust laws”), with Fed. Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 218 (1922)
(affirming judgment for defendants because conduct charged against defendants was not
an interference with commerce amongst the States and therefore not within purview of
the Antitrust Acts).
39. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (“Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion
of the Supreme Court that longstanding exemption of professional baseball’s reserve
system from federal antitrust laws is an established aberration in which Congress has
acquiesced and is entitled to benefit of stare decisis, and any inconsistency or illogic is
to be remedied by the Congress and not by the Supreme Court.”); see Curt Flood Act of
1998, 112 Stat. 2824, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012) (removing baseball’s exemption from
antitrust law with respect to the major–league baseball player market).
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II. BEHAVIOR PROHIBITED BY ANTITRUST LAW AND ZUFFA’S BUSINESS
PRACTICES
Antitrust law is the blanket definition of all laws that are intended to
prevent anticompetitive business practices.40 The legislative intent to punish
anticompetitive conduct should not be confused with the intent to punish big
business.41 A big business is defined as a business that dominates a market
through superior efficiency rather than anticompetitive practices.42 While
pro–competitive business practices increase supply and reduce prices,
anticompetitive practices reduce supply and raise prices.43 The following
sections will outline the steps required to find an abuse of market power: (a)
establishing a relevant market in which a business may exercise market
power; (b) the methods by which market power is exercised including
barriers to market entry, market foreclosure, and exclusionary practices; (c)
the methods courts use to determine whether an antitrust violation occurred;
and (d) the unique applications of antitrust law to sports and professional
athletics. The Section will conclude by summarizing Zuffa’s business
practices.
A. Establishing the Relevant Market
Antitrust laws are designed to protect markets and the competitive process
from anticompetitive behavior. Thus, antitrust analysis requires a market in
which competition may have been harmed. A market is defined as a set of
goods or services that are reasonably interchangeable with one another.44 In
40. Antitrust Laws and You, DOJ (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/anti
trust-laws-and-you.
41. 21 CONG. REC. S2461 (Apr. 8, 1890) (explaining that the purpose of antitrust law
is only to regulate the conduct of businesses in so far as they harm competition); Thomas
C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the Federal
Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 337, 380 (2000). See generally 21 CONG. REC. S2461-62
(daily ed. Apr. 8, 1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (explaining the purpose of the
Sherman Act is to alleviate the harms induced by trusts and combinations which
collaborate to dominate the American economy through harm to competition).
42. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
872, 879 (2004); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 525–26 (1911)
(interpreting the Sherman Act as targeting only those who “shall monopolize or attempt
to monopolize,” that is, those who act to obtain monopoly power rather than those who
merely possess it); Arthur, supra note 41, at 380.
43. Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust
Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 248 (1987).
44. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). It is important to note that there is some dispute as to whether it is necessary
to the antitrust analysis to define the market. Compare Nat’l Hockey League Players
Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462, 466, 470 (6th Cir. 2005) (ruling
that identifying a relevant market is necessary to bring action under federal antitrust law),
with United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 7 P. Areeda,
Antitrust Law 1503 at 376) (“[C]ourts typically allow proof of the defendant’s ‘market
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defining a market, the court must look to all reasonable substitutes for the
product or services in question.45 A firm cannot have market dominance or
a monopoly in a market where its product can be easily substituted with a
competitor’s “because the ability of consumers to turn to another supplier
restrains a firm from raising prices above the competitive level.”46 The
relevant market must include all other products “reasonably interchangeable
by consumers for the same purposes.”47 Courts accept evidence of direct,
indirect, or even probable injury to competition as sufficient to support a
successful antitrust claim.48
Whether two products are in the same market depends on consumers’
ability to use them for the same purposes.49 For example, in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America,50 the Supreme Court found the defendant
monopolized the virgin aluminum ingot market.51 Rejecting the argument
that recycled aluminum could be used in place of pure virgin ingot,52 the
Court explained that although recycled aluminum could be used in the place
of virgin ingot, it was not a reasonable substitute because recycled aluminum
cannot serve all the same purposes as virgin ingot.53 As a result, the products
were not reasonably interchangeable and they were not in the same market.54
A broader market definition would have undermined the government’s
argument against Aluminum Company because market power was only
demonstrable in the virgin ingot market.55
Contrastingly, in United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,56 the
power’ [instead of defining a relevant market] due to the difficulty of isolating the market
effects of challenged conduct . . . .”).
45. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
46. Id. at 50 (quoting Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 218).
47. Fred Johnson Cement Block Co. v. Waylite Co., 184 F. Supp. 855, 857 (D. Minn.
1960).
48. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946) (accepting
evidence companies acting in concert as evidence of collusion and harm to competition);
Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., 888 F. Supp. 274, 281 (D. Mass. 1995)
(accepting internal memoranda concerning intentionally anticompetitive conduct as
evidence of anticompetitive conduct); Stop & Shop Supermkt. Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 239 F. Supp. 2d 180, 184 (D.R.I. 2003) (accepting evidence that output had been
reduced and prices increasing as evidence of probable anticompetitive conduct).
49. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 425–26 (2d Cir.
1945).
50. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
51. Id. at 423.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 434–44.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 425–26.
56. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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Court held that defining the relevant market requires that all products that
are reasonably interchangeable with the one in question be included in the
relevant market, but products that are not reasonably interchangeable should
be excluded.57 Here, the government argued that Du Pont had market power
in the cellophane wrapping market.58 The Court rejected this argument
because although Du Pont did have market power over the cellophane
wrapping market, cellophane wrapping was reasonably interchangeable with
a number of other wrapping products that could be used for all the same
purposes.59
B. Prohibited Conduct in the Relevant Market: Foreclosure, Exclusion, and
Barriers to Entry
For a monopoly to profitably exercise market power and maintain its
market dominance, there must be barriers to market entry.60 Otherwise, new
firms will enter the market offering products at a more competitive price.61
The only way a monopoly can profit from the exercise of market power is if
consumers have no reasonable substitute producer to buy from.62
Among other things, monopolies prevent market entry through
exclusionary conduct such as implementing exclusive contracts and
foreclosing inputs.63 The Clayton Act section 3,64 proscribes exclusive
dealings contracts which “substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce” by prohibiting one or more of the
parties from dealing with competitors.65 Input foreclosure occurs when the
supplier of an input is forced to only deal with a single buyer.66 Should a
buyer create an exclusive dealings contract with each supplier of a given
input, the buyer’s competitors will be unable to access the input entirely

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 395–400.
Id.
Id.
CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, ANTITRUST 46–47 (2d ed. 2014) (explaining the
economic principals of how monopolies profit from excluding competition).
61. Id. at 48 (explaining that monopolies are able to maximize their profits by selling
their products at an above competitive–market price).
62. Id. at 196 (explaining the importance of excluding competitors from the market
and maintaining market power or market dominance in order to continue charging
monopoly prices).
63. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314–15 (1949)
(finding that Standard Oil used an exclusive contracting scheme to foreclose inputs,
specifically transportation, from competitors).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012).
65. Id.
66. United States v. Dentsply, 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005).

656

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 6.3

foreclosing the market to competitors.67 Such arrangements restrain trade by
preventing the relevant market from growing in size and scope.68 Under
recent jurisprudence, an exclusive dealings contract must foreclose at least
thirty percent of the relevant market to competitors,69 have a term greater
than one year, and not be easily terminated to violate the Clayton Act section
3.70
For example, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that an exclusive contracting agreement violated antitrust law due to market
foreclosure.71 Standard Oil formed contracts with 6.7% of the railway
market, preventing competitors from using those railways in a cost–effective
manner.72 Due to this inhibition on competitors, an essential input to the sale
of oil, transportation, was foreclosed and the practice reduced competition in
the oil market.73 The Supreme Court held that the contracting scheme was
anticompetitive in violation of the Clayton Act section 3.74
In contrast, the Supreme Court balanced its approach to input foreclosure
in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,75 when it held that for exclusive
dealings contracts to violate antitrust law, the contracts must foreclose a
significant portion of the market to competitors and harm competition.76 In
this case, an electrical company entered a twenty-year exclusive dealings
contract with a coal company.77 The Supreme Court held that all contracts
foreclose the market in some capacity and that the foreclosure must be
significant enough to have a negative impact on competition.78 Because the
portion of the market foreclosed by the contract was less than one percent,
the Court found that there was no negative impact on competition.79
A more extreme example of input foreclosure is a monopsony; an
economic phenomenon which forces all suppliers of a product or service to
67. Id.
68. Id. at 191 (“[W]hen a monopolists’ actions are designed to prevent one or more

new or potential competitors from gaining a foothold in the market by exclusionary
conduct, its success in that goal is not only injurious to the potential competitor but also
to competition in general . . . .”).
69. Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding foreclosure of thirty–eight percent of the relevant market to be lawful).
70. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984).
71. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314–15 (1949).
72. Id. at 305.
73. Id. at 314–15.
74. Id.
75. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
76. Id. at 333–35.
77. Id. at 322.
78. Id. at 333–35.
79. Id.
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deal with a single buyer.80 When a company achieves monopsony power it
is able to set its buying prices below the market price and sometimes below
the suppliers’ production costs.81 Such a monopsony was alleged in In re
Beef Industries Litigation,82 where a major beef packer, IBP, was alleged to
have acquired monopsony power and used it anticompetitively.83 IBP was
acquitted of the charges because the court found that that IBP did not abuse
its position of market dominance.84 Further, the court stated, “[i]f IBP had
monopsony power, it would take illegal advantage of that situation by
reducing its purchases of fed cattle in order to reduce its costs and make a
higher profit on each head of cattle processed.”85 In other words, IBP acted
procompetitively, as a big business rather than restraining trade.
C. Modes of Antitrust Analysis
The relevant modes of antitrust analysis are per se and rule of reason
analysis.86 Courts implement per se analysis when the violations are based
on business practices that are expressly prohibited due to their well–
established anticompetitive effects.87 Examples of per se violations include:
group boycotts, concerted refusals to deal, and agreements among
competitors not to compete.88 Courts do not give per se violations the benefit
of any balancing test because these violations do not have any
procompetitive justifications.89 For example, in United States v. Andreas,90
the defendant companies were caught red–handed colluding to fix the price
and production rate of their goods. Further, ranking executives were
recorded saying “the competitor is our friend, the consumer is our enemy.”91
Such business practices have a clear harmful effect on competition,
80. See generally Culbertson & Weinstein, supra note 25.
81. Id.
82. See generally Meat Price Investigators Assoc. v. Iowa Beef Processors Inc., 907

F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1990).
83. Id. at 515.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 516.
86. Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of Tenors, Real Estate Brokers and Golf Clubs: A Quick
Look at Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, 24 A.B.A. ANTITRUST 40 (2010) (asserting
that ‘quick look’ rule of reason is a tool for courts during summary judgment to save
time when there is a clear outcome to the case without doing a full–blown rule of reason
analysis; this method is known as a truncated rule of reason analysis).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); May, supra note 22, at 365.
88. May, supra note 22, at 365.
89. The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guid
ance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
90. See generally United States v. Andreas, 150 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 1998).
91. JAMES M. LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND, THE SUPERMARKET OF THE WORLD (2002).
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consumers, and markets.92 Courts will not accept any arguments in favor of
these or similar practices.93
Rule of reason analysis is an in depth economic analysis conducted to
determine whether a business practice is anticompetitive or restrains trade.94
Practices challenged under the rule of reason are given the benefit of a
balancing test weighing procompetitive benefits of the practice against
potentially anticompetitive effects.95 Rule of reason jurisprudence interprets
the Sherman Act to prohibit business practices which have the “actual or
probable” effect of imposing an undue restraint on trade and requires a
balancing test.96 This balancing test incorporates economic benefits brought
about by potentially justifiable restraints of trade, such as contracts.97
Specifically, courts will balance: (1) whether there is a potential harm to the
competitive process; and (2) whether there are procompetitive justifications
for the allegedly illegal behavior, called “efficiencies,” to determine whether
there is an illegal net anticompetitive effect.98
The term “efficiencies” refers to economic and competitive benefits that
ultimately reach consumers resulting from business practices challenged
under antitrust law.99 The concept of efficiencies was first introduced in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel100 where the court held that contracts
in restraint of trade are legal so long as they are ancillary to a lawful purpose.
This Addyston ruling is interpreted today to allow restraints of trade that
directly benefit consumers.101 For example, in Broadway Music Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcast System, Inc.,102 the defendant music companies
allegedly engaged in a horizontal price fixing agreement.103 This agreement
92. May, supra note 22, at 365.
93. Id.
94. PHILLIP AREEDA ET. AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST

PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, 15–16 (1978).
95. May, supra note 22, at 365.
96. Arthur, supra note 41, at 388; see, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 794 (1946) (the Court focused its industry analysis on a set number of years,
1931–1939, in which the defendants were alleged to have violated the antitrust laws);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 74 (1911).
97. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898).
98. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 50; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282.
99. Thomas B. Leary, Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story of Ongoing Evolution, FTC
(Nov. 8, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2002/11/efficiencies-andantitrust-story-ongoing-evolution.
100. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
101. See, e.g., Broadway Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
102. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
103. Id. at 2.
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would have been illegal under antitrust laws, if not for the fact that Broadway
Music was able to demonstrate that the agreement benefited consumers by
reducing costs; the horizontal agreement allowed music producers to avoid
repeat transactions, each one with associated costs that reached
consumers.104 This increased efficiency justified the otherwise illegal
behavior by benefiting consumers.105
Rule of reason analysis incorporates market data and industry analysis,
when both relevant and available, as this information provides direct
evidence of the effects that business practices have had on the relevant
market.106 This method is exemplified in American Tobacco Co. v. United
States107 where the Supreme Court focused on a set number of years, 1931–
1939, in which the defendants were alleged to have violated antitrust laws.108
The Court compared the defendants’ rate of cigarette production and sales to
the rest of the tobacco industry.109 The size of the defendant companies in
relation to competitors was found to be enough to establish a conspiracy to
restrain trade and to monopolize the tobacco industry.110 The Court went on
to justify the method of economic analysis based on the commonly held
belief that insurmountable competition discourages market entry by new
market competitors.111
D. Antitrust Law in the Sports Industry and Labor Markets
Competition between firms creates the best products and the best market
conditions for employees within that industry.112 Labor market competition
forces firms to offer employees competitive wages or risk losing employees
to firms offering higher wages.113 The result is usually a split of the best
employees between different companies within the relevant industry.114
Professional sports are unique in that dividing the best employees into
different promotions reduces the quality of the final product.115 This is
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 21.
Id.
See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 796 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932))
(“Size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the
opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the past.”).
111. Id. at 813 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
427 (1945)).
112. GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS 188 (7th ed. 2015).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Sherwin Rosen & Allen Sanderson, Labor Markets in Professional Sports 4
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because the most competitive products in the sports industry are the best
athletes competing against each other,116 hence, football’s Super Bowl,
soccer’s World Cup, and the pinnacle of every other sport.
Team sports, such as football, basketball, and baseball have dealt with this
problem by defining different teams as separate economic entities117 and
defining games, the product, as joint ventures.118 Individual sports like
MMA present a paradox with production of the most desirable product on
the one side and the antitrust issue of competition on the other. The best
product necessitates most, if not all, of the best athletes in the sport
competing in a single promotion.119
A strong example of increasing market place competition while uniting
more athletes in a single promotion took place in Fraser v. Major League
Soccer, LLC.120 In Fraser, the defendant, Major League Soccer (“MLS”),
acquired another soccer league in order to make itself more competitive on
an international scale.121 Rather than eliminate competing teams from the
industry and create a less competitive market, MLS promoted competition
within the soccer industry internationally by acquiring a competitor to better
compete (economically and athletically) with international teams.122
On the other hand, labor market competition is inhibited in various
professional sports by contractual clauses that limit athletes’ ability to
change employers.123 Infamously, the National Football League (“NFL”)
implemented what was known as the “Rozelle Rule”124 while Major League
Baseball (“MLB”) implemented the “Reserve Clause.”125 The function of
the Rozelle Rule was to allow the NFL to manage disputes between players
and teams when the player wanted to move to a different team for increased
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7573, 2000).
116. Id.
117. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 196 (2010) (defining sports teams as
legally distinct entities and cooperation between teams as joint ventures); Fraser v. Major
League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 55 (surveying conflicting opinions as to whether sports
teams constitute distinct entities).
118. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 196. See generally Roger G. Noll, The Organization of
Sports Leagues (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 02–43,
2003).
119. Rosen & Sanderson, supra note 115, at 6 (explaining how top athletic performers draw large audiences while even slightly less competitive athletes see significantly
smaller audiences and therefore incomes drop off).
120. See 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002).
121. Id. at 55.
122. Id. at 59.
123. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346
U.S. 356 (1953); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
124. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610.
125. Toolson, 346 U.S. 362 n. 10.
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wages.126 The disputes would be resolved by the NFL Commissioner, Pete
Rozelle, by instructing the team receiving the moving player to pay the
player’s previous team a fee.127 The actual effect of the Rozelle Rule reduced
player mobility and depressed player wages.128 The Rozelle Rule was found
to be an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act
section 1 because the rule was not essential to the league’s function and it
was more restrictive than necessary.129
Contractual restrictions on athletes’ abilities to move from one
organization to another should be no more restrictive than necessary and
essential to the organization’s function, otherwise, the restrictions may
violate antitrust law.130 Despite the presence of antitrust laws, lack of wage
competition due to a dominant firm with monopsony power has been a
prevailing problem for athletes throughout the sports industry, most notably
in baseball.131 Baseball was exempt from antitrust laws until relatively
recently.132 For decades, the MLB enforced the Reserve Clause, which kept
players bound to the team they first signed with for the extent of their career
and after retirement.133 The MLB’s contracting scheme was challenged in
Toolson v. New York Yankees134 and Flood v. Kuhn.135 In Toolson, the
Supreme Court held that baseball is a pastime, not a part of interstate
commerce and, therefore, the contracting scheme was outside the
constitutional scope of the Commerce Clause.136 In Flood, the Supreme
Court held that the legality of the MLB’s contracting scheme was a political
question.137 This holding was met with criticism, none more harsh than that
of Justice Marshall stating in his dissent that “[t]o non–athletes it might
appear that petitioner was virtually enslaved by the owners of major league
baseball clubs who bartered among themselves for his services.”138 Despite
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 622–23.
Id. at 620.
Andrew Tarman, The Effect of Monopsony Power in Major League Baseball on
the Salaries of Players with Less Than Six Years in the Major, ILL. WESLEYAN U.
DIGITAL COMMONS 1, 1 (2005).
132. See The Curt Flood Act of 1998, 112 STAT. 2824, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2016) (“An
Act requiring the general application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball, and
for other purposes.”).
133. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357, 362–64 (1953).
134. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
135. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
136. Toolson, 346 U.S. 356-57.
137. Flood, 407 U.S. 258, 273–74.
138. Id. at 289 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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the judiciary’s avoidance of applying antitrust law to baseball, baseball
players advocated for themselves and improved market conditions for
themselves by engaging in collective bargaining.139 Rather than fight an
uphill battle against the dominant firm, baseball players unionized forming
the Major League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) to demand
minimum contractual terms and collective bargaining opportunities.140
Athletes in the boxing industry faced similarly coercive contracts prior to
the passage of the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act (“Ali Act”).141
Although there was no monopolist, boxers faced coercive and one–sided
contracts.142 Among other things, the Ali Act set minimum safety and
contract requirements for participants in the boxing industry.143 Regular
conflicts of interest among judges and referees resulted in questionable
outcomes as to who won or lost a bout.144 The most important feature of the
Ali Act is to prohibit contracts allowing managers and promoters to unfairly
control and manipulate athlete pay.145

139. Id. at 294.
140. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 130–131 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Brown v. Pro

Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (holding that “the non–statutory labor
exemption waives antitrust liability for restraints on competition imposed through the
collective bargaining process, so long as such restraints operate primarily in a labor
market characterized by collective bargaining”); MLBPA Basic Agreement, art. III
(2012–2016); Our History, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS, http://www.mlbplayer
s.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=211042995&DBOEMID=34000 (last visited Sept.
30, 2017).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012).
142. H.R.5365, 114th Cong. (2015); John S. Nash, Congressman Markwayne Mullin
Talks About Bringing the Ali Act to MMA, BLOODY ELBOW (Apr. 18, 2016),
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2016/4/18/11449348/congressman-markwayne-mullintalks-about-bringing-the-ali-act-to-mma.
143. Brad Ehrlichman, In This Corner: An Analysis of Federal Boxing Legislation, 34
COLUM. J.L. ARTS 421, 421, 423 (2011).
144. Id. at 423.
145. H.R.5365, 114th Cong. (2015).

2017

THE ULTIMATE FIGHTING CHAMPIONSHIP AND ZUFFA

663

E. Zuffa’s Business Practices
Zuffa’s business practices implicate two closely related, but technically
distinct, markets: the MMA Promotional Market and the Elite MMA Labor
Market (fighters ranked in the top thirty world–wide). Zuffa controls an
enormous share of both markets. A company’s level of control over a given
market is readily demonstrated by its share of industry revenue.146 Figure 1
below, illustrates Zuffa’s enormous share of industry gate revenue.147 As it
demonstrates, since 2006, Zuffa has taken in a minimum 90.23% of industry
gate revenue, a maximum of 98.85%, and averaged 96.11%.148

Figure 1: Zuffa's Share of Industry Gate
Revenue
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Further, as demonstrated in Figure 2 below, Zuffa averaged 99.47% of
industry pay–per–view sales from 2008 to 2015.149

146. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Nobody in Particular
Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1102 (D. Colo.
2004).
147. Figure 1 was created using information compiled from: Live Gate & Atten dance,
PAYOUT THE BUS. OF MMA, http://mmapayout.com/blue-book/live-gate-att endance/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
148. See Figure 1.
149. See infra Figure 2. Figure 2 was created using information compiled from: Pay–
per–View, PAYOUT THE BUS. OF MMA, http://mmapayout.com/blue-book/pay-per-view/
(last visit-ed Mar. 15, 2017).
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Figure 2: Zuffa's Share of Industry PayPer-View Sales
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As demonstrated in Figure 3 below, Zuffa has steadily grown its dominant
share in the Elite MMA Labor Market: in 2008, Zuffa’s share was 42.29%
and rose to 68.67% in 2015.150

Figure 3: Zuffa's Share of the Elite MMA
Labor Market
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Additionally, as demonstrated in Figure 4 below, Zuffa has increased the
number of MMA promotions every year while lowering the cost to
consumers by expanding out of pay–per–view only and into television.151
150. Figure 3 was created using information compiled from: Current MMA Rank ings,
FIGHT MATRIX, http://www.fightmatrix.com/mma-ranks/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017) and
SHERDOG, http://www.sherdog.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
151. Sanneh, supra note 12. Figure 4 was created using information compiled from:
Blue Book, PAYOUT THE BUS. OF MMA, http://mmapayout.com/blue-book/ (last visited
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Figure 4: Zuffa MMA Promotions
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Zuffa’s market dominance alone is not enough to cause an antitrust
injury.152 However, several of Zuffa’s business practices do raise antitrust
concerns, specifically Zuffa’s (1) specific intent to reduce competition
through the purchase of PRIDE FC,153 (2) indefinite contractual length,154 (3)
widespread use of non-compete clauses,155 and (4) reduction in fighter pay
that was not followed by a significant reduction in labor market share.
First, specific intent to reduce competition was revealed (accidentally) by
the UFC during litigation in an internal memo to the UFC from one of its
lawyers; the purpose of the PRIDE FC acquisition was “to stop others from
buying Pride and to acquire Pride to shut the business down and acquire its
fighters for the UFC.”156 Zuffa acquired two additional firms under similar
circumstances, Strikeforce and World Extreme Cagefighting (“WEC”).157
Mar. 15, 2017).
152. Arthur, supra note 41, at 380.
153. Id.
154. See Zane Simon, UFC Fighter Contract Details Revealed and Analyzed,
BLOODY ELBOW (May 14, 2013) (quoting section 4.2 of Eddie Alvarez’s UFC contract),
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2013/5/14/4330572/ufc-fighter-contracts-rev ealed-danawhite-fertitta-mma-news.
155. Paul Gift, Dissecting the Fighter’s Antitrust Lawsuit Against the UFC, Part 2,
BLOODY ELBOW (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2014/12/18/7414
267/mma-ufc-fighter-antitrust-lawsuit-monopoly-monopsony-cung-le-nate-quarry-jonfitch-part-2.
156. Cung Le v. Zuffa, 2:15-cv-01045-RFB-PAL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69813, at
*23 (D.C. Nev. 2016).
157. Harty, supra note 14.

666

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 6.3

Strikeforce distinguished itself by promoting female fighters which quickly
gained traction and viewership.158 Before acquiring Strikeforce, Zuffa
weakened the business through the practice of “counter–programming,” or
strategically planning UFC events to occur at the same time as Strikeforce
events in order to reduce Strikeforce viewership, TV ratings, and thereby
company value.159 The WEC similarly attempted to distinguish itself by
promoting fights in smaller weight classes.160 Both of these MMA
promotions were competing with the UFC by offering competitive wages,
lower prices to consumers, and a product that, in one way or another, was
distinguishable from what the UFC produced until Zuffa eliminated them as
competitors.161
Second, the UFC’s Championship Clause prevents top-ranked fighters
from negotiating with other organizations or leaving the UFC by
“automatically extend[ing] the contract if the fighter should win a UFC
title.”162 This clause states:
If, at the expiration of the Term, Fighter is then a UFC
champion, the Term shall automatically be extended for the
period commencing on the Terminate Date and ending on
the later of (i) one (1) year from the Termination Date; or
(ii) the date on which Fighter has participated in three (3)
bouts promoted by ZUFFA, regardless of weight class or
title, following the Termination Date (“Extension Term”).163
The Champions Clause extends indefinitely, holding the fighter bound to
Zuffa.
Third, Zuffa’s contracts always contain non–compete clauses which
prevent the fighters from participating in other promotions for the extent of
the contractual relationship without Zuffa or the UFC’s express consent.164
The UFC’s contracts allow them to hold a fighter on contract without having
any fights (and therefore keeping the fighter from generating income) for
158. Josh Gross, UFC Buys Rival Strikeforce, ESPN (Mar. 13, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/extra/mma/news/story?id=6209923.
159. MMAjunkie Staff, Saturday’s Strikeforce Show Countered by Spike TV “UFC’s
Ultimate Fighters” Special, MMA JUNKIE (May 12, 2010), http://mmajunkie.
com/2010/05/saturdays-strikeforce-show-countered-by-spike-tv-ufcs-ultimate-fightsspecial.
160. Harty, supra note 14.
161. See id. (detailing Zuffa’s purchase of the WEC once it had success marketing
fighters who were physically smaller than those in the UFC and, similarly, Strikeforce
was purchased once it had success marketing female fighters).
162. Simon, supra note 154.
163. Id.
164. Jeffrey B. Same, Comment, Breaking the Chokehold: An Analysis of Potential
Defenses Against Coercive Contract in Mixed Martial Arts, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1057, 1062, 1072, 1086 (2012).
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years at a time.165 These non–compete clauses also prevent other promotions
from competing for the athlete’s contracts by offering higher wages than the
UFC.
Fourth, in 2015, the UFC eliminated one of the primary income generators
for fighters as part of the Reebok Deal of 2015 (“Reebok Deal”) and greatly
increased revenue in the process.166 Previously, fighters made up for the low
wages paid by the UFC by wearing articles of clothing and flying a banner
with brand logos in exchange for payment.167 The Reebok Deal eliminated
that source of income by requiring fighters to wear Reebok clothing168 and
excluding all other clothing sponsorships.169 This resulted in widespread
criticism for its effect on fighter income.170
In a competitive labor market, reduction in pay leads to laborers working
elsewhere;171 however, industry data indicates that the UFC’s share in the
Elite MMA Labor Market held steady through 2015 despite the reduction in
fighter income.172 While some fighters have left the UFC for more
competitive wages elsewhere, the number of fighters who have been able to
leave is a small portion of the UFC’s large fighter roster, which contains over
four-hundred fighters.173 It is important to note that the fighters who left the
165. Marc Raimondi, UFC Says Georges St. Pierre is Still Under Zuffa Contract,
MMA FIGHTING (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.mmafighting.com/2016/10/17/133130
82/ufc-says-georges-st-pierre-is-still-under-zuffa-contract (detailing a dispute between
Zuffa and a contracted fighter after failure to come to a payment agreement and the
fighter claimed to have been released from his contract); Guilherme Cruz, Jose Aldo
Requests to be Released from the UFC, MMA FIGHTING (Sept. 27, 2016),
https://www.mmafighting.com/2016/9/27/13083694/jose-aldo-requests-his-releasefrom-the-ufc (detailing another dispute between Zuffa and a contracted fighter who
wanted to be released after being repeatedly deceived; the UFC refused); Paul Gift, Does
the Length of Fight Careers Matter in the UFC Antitrust Lawsuit, BLOODY ELBOW (Dec.
30, 2014), bloodyelbow.com/2014/12/30/7465287/mma-ufc-antitrust-law suit-fightcareer-length.
166. Andrew Brennan, Why Is The UFC–Reebok Deal Exploiting UFC Fighters and
Condoning Pay Gaps?, FORBES (May 16, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrew
brennan/2016/05/16/is-it-the-ufc-or-is-it-reebok-that-is-exploiting-ufc-fighters-andcondoning-pay-gaps/#70dce6cd657f; Gareth A. Davies, UFC’s £45 Tie-Up With Reebok
a Big Deal as Fighters Get Dressed for Financial Success, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/ufc/11268220/UFC-signs-70-mill
iondeal-with-Reebok-will-see-500-fighters-wearing-firms.html (detailing the amount
Reebok paid the UFC in exchange for the Reebok Deal contract; $70 million in revenue
that was previously unrealized).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. BORJAS, supra note 112, at 188.
172. See supra Figure 4.
173. Zane Simon, Fighters Talk Moving to Bellator: “There is No Negotiation” With
the UFC, BLOODY ELBOW (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2016/
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UFC by choice for more competitive contracts were all well-known names
in the sport and major revenue generators with significantly more bargaining
power than the average fighter.174
III. ZUFFA’S MARKET DOMINANCE
Zuffa appears to have significantly increased competition in the MMA
Promotional Market by lowering prices and increasing output, but has
decreased competition in the labor market and, arguably, acted in restraint of
trade. The UFC possesses dominant market shares in both the MMA
Promotional Market and the Elite MMA Labor Market.175 The market for
MMA Promotions is the sales side of the UFC’s business while the Elite
MMA Labor Market is the input side. These market definitions are
appropriate because neither is reasonably interchangeable with other
products or services. Elite MMA Promotions consist of one–on–one
violence with limited rules.176 The only promotion that is comparable in
concept and scope is professional wrestling; both involve minimal rules and
one-on-one hand to hand combat.177 However, the dominant firm in
professional wrestling, World Wrestling Entertainment (“WWE”), is a
subsidiary of WME–IMG, which purchased a controlling share of the UFC
from Zuffa in 2016.178 Therefore, even if professional wrestling were
reasonably interchangeable with MMA, this point would be irrelevant for
purposes of antitrust analysis since the organizations dominating the two
industries are owned by the same holding company. Defining the relevant
labor market as Elite MMA Fighters is also appropriate because no other
athletes, or laborers, are reasonably interchangeable with MMA fighters
which qualify as “elite” or are ranked in the top thirty world-wide. The fact
that other athletes are not interchangeable with MMA fighters has been
demonstrated by attempts by other athletes to compete in the UFC and, for
the most part, failing.179
4/6/11378328/ufc-vs-bellator-fighters-speak-out-ben-henderson-josh-thomson-mattmitrione-mma-news.
174. Id.
175. See supra Figures 1, 2, 3, & 4.
176. See What Is MMA and the UFC?, UFC, http://www.ufc.com/discover/sport (last
visited Nov. 16, 2016) (defining MMA as “[a] full contact sport . . . with minimal rules
. . . promoted as a competition to determine the most effective martial art for unarmed
combat situations”).
177. Michael Wickham, Differences Between WWE and UFC, EZINE ARTICLES (Sept.
5,
2010),
http://ezinearticles.com/?Differences-Between-WWE-and-UFC&id=4
967504.
178. Rogers, supra note 6.
179. See, e.g., Brett Okamoto, Mickey Gall Submits CM Punk by Rear–Naked Choke
in First Round, ESPN (Sept. 11, 2016), http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/17517
456/cm-punk-submitted-mickey-gall-debut-ufc-203 (detailing a former professional
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Neither the UFC nor Zuffa have committed a per se violation of antitrust
law. Any argument that the UFC and Zuffa have committed a per se
violation of antitrust law is without merit as there have been no boycotts,
price fixes, or other established per se antitrust violations comparable to the
actions in United States v. Andreas.180 As a result, the proper mode of
analysis is rule of reason. Rule of reason analysis requires a relevant market,
market data, a history of the relevant entity’s business practices, and an
economic analysis of the effects those practices have on the market.181 Under
rule of reason analysis, if Zuffa’s business practices are justified by
procompetitive benefits which increase efficiency and benefit consumers
then it has not violated antitrust law.
Additionally, it is clear that the business of Elite MMA Promotions and
activity in the Elite MMA Labor Market, fighters constitutes “trade or
commerce among the several states” within the meaning of the Sherman
Act.182 It is also uncontroversial to define the relevant geographic markets
as international because MMA promotions occur throughout the world and
fighters from dozens of countries enter the Elite MMA Labor Market.183
To violate antitrust law, Zuffa must have exercised its market power in an
anticompetitive manner which harmed competition.184 Such an exercise of
market power appears differently in the two relevant markets. In the MMA
Promotional Market, exercise of market power would be characterized by
increasing prices and decreasing supply while still profiting.185 On the other
hand, exercise of market power in the Elite MMA Labor Market would be
characterized by decreasing wages without losing laborers.186
wrestler’s failed attempt to compete in the UFC); Michael David Smith, UFC: 118 Randy
Couture Submits James Toney, MMA FIGHTING (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.
mmafighting.com/2010/08/28/ufc-118-randy-couture-submits-james-toney (detailing a
former boxing world champion’s failed attempt to compete in the UFC). But see Lewis
Mckeever, UFC 200’s Mark Hunt: Brock Lesnar is ‘Juiced to the Gills’, BLOODY ELBOW
(June 9, 2016), http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2016/6/9/11894244/ufc-200s-mark-huntbrock-lesnar-is-juiced-to-the-gills (detailing a professional wrestler’s success competing
in the UFC, despite serious questions about his use of performance enhancing drugs).
180. See Are UFC Contracts, Like a Diamond, Forever?, COMBAT SPORTS L. (Sept.
28, 2015), https://combatsportslaw.com/2015/09/28/are-ufc-contracts-like-a-diamondforever/ (detailing an arguably coercive contracting practice that was discontinued by the
UFC).
181. Oliver, supra note 86.
182. See United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 240–41 (1955).
183. FighterMan, 100 New Countries Join The Fight, MMA FED’N (May 10, 2016),
http://mmafederation.com/2016/05/10/100-new-countries-to-join-the-fight/.
184. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
185. Id.
186. Tejvan Pettinger, Monopsony Exploitation, ECONS. HELP (Jan. 6, 2012), http://
www.economicshelp.org/blog/4840/labour-markets/monopsony-exploitation/
(exercising monopsony power allows employers to decrease wages without losing
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A. MMA Promotional Market Analysis
Zuffa dominates the MMA Promotional Market,187 but that alone is not
sufficient to violate antitrust law.188 Under rule of reason analysis, Zuffa’s
business practices are suspect. The pattern of eliminating competing firms
reduces competition, thus implicating the Clayton Antitrust Act189 and the
Antimerger Act of 1950,190 which prohibit mergers and acquisitions when
“the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.”191
In almost identical fashion to Standard Oil,192 Zuffa bought out
competition, took control of management, and attained market dominance.
The UFC took control of the World Fighting Alliance, the WEC,
International Fight League, Strikeforce, and PRIDE FC with the
aforementioned specific intent to reduce competition.193 The UFC’s
consistent reaction to competing firms offering innovative products
distinguishable from the UFC’s is to buy them out.194
The actual effects of these practices are demonstrated in Figure 1, Figure
2, Figure 3, and Figure 4, which show the gradual increase in various
indicators of market share approaching, if not exactly, 100%.195 Such a level
of promotional market dominance reduces competition in the market for
MMA fighters and reduces the number of competitors in the market for
MMA promotions.196
Despite eliminating competitors from the industry for the MMA
Promotional Market, the UFC has not reduced the level of competition in the
industry, evidenced by the consistent increase in the number of MMA events
employees because employees have no other employers to turn to or use as bargaining
leverage).
187. See supra Figures 1, 2, & 3 (holding a more than ninety percent share of industry pay-per-view sales and gate attendance as well as more than a sixty share of the
relevant labor market).
188. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 50 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)) (defining the illegal monopolization as having two elements:
“(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power”).
189. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
191. Id.
192. 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911) (detailing the extent of Standard Oil’s elimination of
competition throughout the United States to corner the market on crude oil).
193. See generally Harty, supra note 14.
194. Id.
195. See supra Figures 1, 2, 3, & 4.
196. See supra Figure 4; see also SAGERS, supra note 60, at 46–47 (demonstrating
that the probable effects of any one firm dominating a market include reduction in output,
increase in prices above market levels, and other restraints of trade).
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the UFC promotes annually.197 Further, the UFC has reduced prices for
consumers by bringing the UFC to TV rather than just pay–per–view.198
Increasing production while lowering prices is the exact opposite of the
anticompetitive tendency to reduce output while raising prices. In other
words, the UFC’s conduct in the market for MMA Promotional Market has
been procompetitive. Therefore, the UFC likely has not violated antitrust
law or conducted itself in an anticompetitive manner in the market for MMA
Promotional Market.
Zuffa’s business practices in the market for MMA Promotional Market are
comparable to the defendant’s actions in Fraser v. Major League Soccer.199
Like MLS, the UFC bought out competition and, in the process, increased
the level of competition in the relevant market. The acquisitions of
competing firms and MMA promotions200 eliminated major competitors in
the MMA Promotional Market. Nonetheless, the number of events produced
by the UFC indicates an increase in competition.201
While the UFC’s acquisitions appear to have increased competition in the
MMA Promotional Market, these acquisitions have reduced labor market
competition. This effect was not seen in Fraser because there was still an
international community of teams competing in the labor market for soccer
players.202 The economic effect of Zuffa’s acquisitions was the creation of
a monopsony in which the UFC was the only buyer of a specific input: Elite
MMA Labor. Although the market for elite MMA fighters is a labor market,
it is also protected by antitrust law designed to prevent monopsony as well
as monopoly.203

B. Elite MMA Labor Market Analysis
Zuffa’s consistent reaction to firms that offer a product which is able to
compete with the UFC’s is to buy them out.204 When the WEC produced
professional MMA in weight–classes that the UFC did not, the UFC bought

197.
198.
199.
200.

Smith, supra note 13; see also supra Figure 4.
Smith, supra note 13.
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 52–55 (1st Cir. 2002).
Jonathon Snowden, The Business of Fighting: A Look Inside the UFC’s Top–
Secret Fighter Contract, BLEACHER REP. (May 14, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/1516575-the-business-of-fighting-a-look-inside-the-ufcs-top-secret-fightercontract.
201. See supra Figure 4.
202. See Jacobson, supra note 26 (explaining that the only difference in antitrust
analysis regarding a labor market monopsony is viewing laborers as “consumers” of
labor subject to the same protections as consumers of any other good or service). See
generally Fraser, 284 F.3d at 47.
203. See Jacobson, supra note 26.
204. Harty, supra note 14.
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out the WEC.205 The same is true of Strikeforce,206 the acquisition that
brought one of MMA’s greatest stars and revenue generators to the UFC,
Ronda Rousey.207 When Invicta FC produced a women’s straw–weight
division (115 pounds), which the UFC did not have, the UFC bought out
each fighter’s contract to form their own women’s straw–weight division.208
Historically, whenever another MMA firm creates a distinguishable or
competitive product, the UFC acquires it and thereby reduces labor market
competition.
The market impact of these business practices is clear: reducing the
number of firms competing in a labor market reduces employee wage
competition and limits those employees to fewer potential employers.209
While there are a small number of firms who are also in the professional
MMA market, none are comparable to the UFC in terms of size, wages, or
overall promotional quality.210
The UFC grew its own labor market share by eliminating viable wage
competitors by acquiring and out-competing them.211 In doing so, the UFC
created unequal bargaining positions between the UFC and its athletes.212
The result of unequal bargaining positions has been fighters’ inability to
significantly influence contractual terms or wages.213 The UFC is able to
offer fighters lower wages than they would if the fighters had any bargaining
power.214 Without the opportunity to receive competitive wages from any
other promotion, the UFC is often the only option.215

205. Id.
206. Josh Gross, UFC Buys Rival Strikeforce, ESPN (Mar. 13, 2011), http://espn.go.

com/extra/mma/news/story?id=6209923.
207. Nathan Ryan, Power Rankings: UFC’s 10 Biggest Draw Cards Based on Star
Power, FOX SPORTS (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.foxsports.com.au/ufc/power-rankingsufcs-10-biggest-draw-cards-based-on-star-power/newsstory/03df1b7fc2c827cdf90081e2138b3e09.
208. Zane Simon, UFC Announces Signing of 11 Women Strawweights for TUF
Season, Winner Becomes First UFC 115lb Champ, BLOODY ELBOW (Dec. 11, 2013)
[hereinafter Simon, UFC Announces], http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2013/12/11/52019
72/ufc-strawweight-tuf-invicta-contracts-first-champion-gadelha-esparza-calderwoodtorres-mma-news.
209. BORJAS, supra note 112, at 187–89.
210. Riley Kontek, Power Ranking the Top 5 MMA Organizations Outside the UFC,
BLEACHER REP. (May 6, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1630207-powerranking-the-top-5-mma-organizations-outside-the-ufc.
211. Snowden, supra note 200.
212. Id.
213. Same, supra note 164, at 1064–66; Brennan, supra note 166.
214. Same, supra note 164, at 1066.
215. Id.
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The UFC’s behavior in the Elite MMA Labor Market is distinguishable
from IBP’s actions in the beef industry.216 While IBP did not “reduce its
costs and make a higher profit” by decreasing output, the UFC used its
monopsony power to reduce its costs through the Reebok Deal. The Reebok
Deal had the “actual effect”217 of allowing the UFC to “take . . . advantage
of that situation by reducing its [payment of fighters] in order to reduce its
costs and make higher profit on each [fight].”218 Zuffa’s use of monopsony
power to reduce wages and thereby increase profits from promotions is the
exact inverse of the IBP’s legal practices.
As an input to the final product of MMA promotions, widespread
application of exclusive dealings contracts requires a foreclosure analysis.219
The non–compete clauses present in every Zuffa signed fighter’s contract
constitutes an exclusive dealings agreement.220 Both consumers and
competition are injured by a foreclosure of an input preventing “potential
competitors from gaining a foothold in the market by exclusionary
conduct.”221
Zuffa’s labor market share is identical to the market share that is
foreclosed to competitors: sixty–six percent.222 These metrics are identical
because Zuffa includes non–compete clauses in all of its fighter contracts.223
Sixty–six percent is well over the 6.7% market foreclosure found to violate
the Clayton Act section 3 in Standard Oil Co. v. United States224 and the
thirty percent minimum consensus market share.225 Further, Zuffa fighter
contracts are neither short-term nor easily terminated.226 Specifically, the
“Championship Clause” permits Zuffa to extend some contracts
indefinitely.227 Fighter contracts have also been used to prevent fighters who
no longer want to work for the UFC from competing in other promotions.228

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1990).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 74 (1911).
In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907 F.2d at 516.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 313–14 (1949).
Simon, supra note 154.
United States v. Dentsply Int’l. Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003)).
222. See supra Figure 3.
223. Gift, supra note 155.
224. Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 305.
225. SAGERS, supra note 60, at 157.
226. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984).
227. Simon, supra note 154.
228. Cruz, supra note 165.
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The “Championship Clause”229 is a near replica of the MLB’s “Reserve
Clause.”230 Like the Reserve Clause, the UFC’s Championship Clause
prevents fighters from negotiating with other organizations or leaving the
UFC by “automatically extend[ing] the contract if the fighter should win a
UFC title.”231 In and of itself, holding an athlete on contract is not illegal;
however, when compared to the average career length of an MMA fighter,232
it is evident that the UFC takes near complete control over a fighter’s
career.233
The actual or probable effects of Zuffa’s control over the labor market are:
(1) harming to both labor market and promotional market competition; and
(2) creating barriers to market entry. The UFC’s unilateral application of the
Reebok Deal significantly reduced the ability of fighters to generate
income.234 The fact that fighters have not left the UFC in significant numbers
is evidence that: (1) there are few MMA promotions that compete with the
UFC in the MMA labor market and;235 (2) the exclusive dealings contracts
are not easily terminated.
However, even if the Elite MMA Labor Market is monopsonized, this is
not dispositive of an antitrust violation; although written in the context of a
monopoly, Trinko236 authoritatively states that market power sufficient “to
charge monopoly prices––at least for a short period––is what attracts
‘business acumen’ in the first place.”237 In other words, a short period
allowing the opportunity to charge monopoly prices is the economy’s reward
for superior efficiency.238 Further, “the possession of monopoly power will
not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.”239

229. Nathaniel Grow, Defining the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Framework
for Determining the Scope of Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 557, 561–62 (2010) (explaining that the “reserve clause” was “a provision
included at the time in all baseball player contracts that precluded players from
negotiating future contracts with anyone but their current employer”).
230. Id. at 561; Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 362 n. 10 (1953).
231. Simon, supra note 154.
232. Gift, supra note 155 (conducting an analysis of the average career length of elite
MMA fighters to be five hundred thirty–three days within which fighters average 3.3
bouts).
233. See id.
234. Brennan, supra note 166.
235. BORJAS, supra note 112, at 188; see also supra Figure 3.
236. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1996)).
237. Id. at 407.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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The UFC’s contracting scheme is anticompetitive. The contracting
scheme provides that (1) fighters cannot compete in other promotions for the
duration of their contractual relationship; (2) the contracts can last
indefinitely; and (3) the contracts are not easily terminated.240 Because of
these contractual elements, fighters can be forced to accept uncompetitive,
potentially below cost, wages.241 Therefore, through this series of
contractual clauses, Zuffa has successfully foreclosed sixty–six percent of
the market and likely violated the Clayton Act section 3 prohibition on
widespread exclusive dealings. Although no single act alone would violate
the Sherman Act, simultaneous use of coercive contracting practice to
require stringent non–compete agreements, use of contract length to hold
fighters in a contract for a period longer than average career length,242 and
reducing fighter income amounts to restraint of trade for purposes of the
Sherman Act section 2.243
C. Balancing Pro and Anti–Competitive Effects
To counterbalance anticompetitive effects and restraints of trade, the UFC
must demonstrate that the practices generate “efficiencies,” or practices that,
in the end, benefit consumers.244 There are significant factors that weigh in
the UFC’s favor in the MMA Promotional Market. MMA has grown faster
than any other sport since its formation in 1993, and the UFC is widely
acknowledged as the driving factor behind that growth.245 Without the
UFC’s growth, marketing, and attraction of both new fighters and fans to
MMA, the MMA industry would not produce the revenue or fighter pay that
it does.246 It is also probable that the UFC’s competitors in the MMA
Promotional Market benefit from the UFC’s success in expanding the
240. See Simon, supra note 154; Gift, supra note 155.
241. See Simon, supra note 154; Brennan, supra note 166; Same, supra note 164, at

1072; see also supra Figure 3.
242. See Simon, supra note 154; Brennan, supra note 166; Same, supra note 164, at
1072; see also supra Figure 3.
243. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.”).
244. See Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (explaining that
sometimes natural monopolies may be justified by efficiencies such as an economy of
scale that provides the lowest possible costs for consumers); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898) (holding that contracts which restrain
trade are enforceable when “[t]he covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main
purpose of a lawful contract”).
245. David Segal, Fighting a Cage Match to Turn the UFC Into a National
Phenomenon, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/busi
ness/fighting-a-cage-match-to-turn-the-ufc-into-a-national-phenomenon.html?_r=0.
246. See Binner, supra note 3 (describing the rise of MMA synonymously with the
rise of the UFC).
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market. Despite eliminating many competitors from the industry for MMA
promotions, the UFC has increased industry competition in two respects:
consistently increasing the number of MMA events the UFC produces
annually247 and reducing the cost of viewership by expanding outside of payper-view.248
Additionally, not every firm that competed with the UFC was eliminated
by a UFC buyout; competitors simply went out of business due to business
decisions gone wrong.249 Importantly, some of these competitors went out
of business after Zuffa’s most recent acquisitions, disqualifying an illegal
merger claim against Zuffa under the Clayton Act.250 The UFC became a
monopoly without buying out its competitors, but by means of superior
efficiency. Companies which achieve market dominance through superior
efficiency are not necessarily safe from antitrust claims.251 However, the
UFC does not present insurmountable competition nor has it created
insurmountable barriers to market entry, as evidenced by the rise of ONE FC
and Bellator.252
The UFC’s pattern of increasing production while lowering prices is the
exact opposite of the anticompetitive tendency to reduce output while raising
prices. While the UFC’s history of counter–programming may appear
predatory, this practice is common, legal, and has even been used by the
UFC’s competitors to draw viewership away from UFC events.253
Therefore, the UFC has not violated antitrust law nor conducted itself in an
anticompetitive manner in the MMA Promotional Market, but rather has
increased competition.
Although the MMA Promotional Market remains competitive, the labor
market for Elite MMA Labor Market is not. The UFC’s unilateral application
of the Reebok Deal significantly reduced the ability of fighters to generate
income.254 The fact that fighters have not left the UFC in significant numbers
is evidence that there are few MMA promotions that can offer wages
comparable to the UFC’s or effectively compete with the UFC in the Elite
247. See supra Figure 2.
248. Smith, supra note 13.
249. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 134 n.14 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Brown v. Pro

Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (holding that “the non–statutory labor
exemption waives antitrust liability for restraints on competition imposed through the
collective bargaining process, so long as such restraints operate primarily in a labor
market characterized by collective bargaining”).
250. Tarman, supra note 131.
251. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (holding that
power to monopolize and intent to monopolize are sufficient to sustain an antitrust
claim).
252. Doyle, supra note 15.
253. MMAjunkie Staff, supra note 159.
254. Brennan, supra note 166.
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MMA Labor Market.255 But, even if the Elite MMA Labor Market is
monopsonized, this is not always dispositive of an antitrust violation.256
Most convincing is the UFC’s steady labor market share despite reducing
fighter income through the Reebok Deal.257 The effects of the Reebok Deal
and its aftermath create a strong case that the UFC has exercised monopsony
power; in a competitive labor market, a reduction in income should lead to
laborers moving to a different company, but this has not been the case.258 If
a greater number of fighters leave the UFC for more competitive wages, as
is expected by economic theory, it will be more likely that a court will find
that greater profits at the expense of fighters was Zuffa’s reward for superior
efficiency under Trinko.259 However, there is little evidence to suggest that
significant numbers of fighters are leaving the UFC, though not for lack of
trying.260
The UFC may also be able to raise a strong defense of its activity in the
MMA labor market under United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel.261 Such
a defense would proceed by claiming that the UFC’s labor market dominance
creates efficiencies that benefits both consumers in the promotional market
and MMA fighters in the labor market. Increasing the number of fighter
contracts the UFC holds may be what allows the UFC to increase the number
of promotions it holds annually, increasing output, and decrease the price of
viewership, thereby benefiting consumers. Fighters may benefit from the
UFC’s labor market dominance due to the increase in prestige that comes
with being a dominant UFC fighter; increasing the number of fighters in the
promotion increases the athletic competitiveness of the promotion. Further,
the increases in promotional viewership has significantly increased wages
for the UFC’s most dominant and popular fighters.262 The argument that
255. BORJAS, supra note 112, at 187; see also supra Figure 3.
256. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)) (defining the illegal
monopolization as having two elements: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power”).
257. Brennan, supra note 166.
258. See supra Figure 3 (demonstrating the UFC’s labor market share holding steady
after the inception of the Reebok Deal, decreasing by only 2.67% of the market).
259. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
260. Raimondi, supra note 165 (detailing a dispute between Zuffa and a contracted
fighter after failure to come to a payment agreement and the fighter claimed to have been
released from his contract); Cruz, supra note 165 (detailing another dispute between
Zuffa and a contracted fighter who wanted to be released after being repeatedly deceived;
the UFC refused); Gift, supra note 165.
261. 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898) (holding that contracts which restrain trade are
enforceable when the “covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of
a lawful contract”).
262. Mike Bohn & John Morgan, UFC 202 Salaries: Conor McGregor Pulls in
Record $3 Million; Nate Diaz Gets $2 Million, MMA JUNKIE (Aug. 20, 2016), http://
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labor market dominance increases competition in the promotional market is
strong, but the argument that this dominance benefits fighters is quite weak.
Zuffa would have to argue that the extensive contractual restrictions imposed
on fighters by their contracts are “merely ancillary to the main purpose of
[the] lawful contract[s], and necessary to protect the covenantee in the [full]
enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract”263 and that the contracts
are not “more restrictive than necessary.”264 It is unlikely that this argument
would succeed because it would require the UFC to argue that reducing
fighter pay and preventing those fighters from finding employment
elsewhere is a “legitimate fruit of the contract,” which it is not.265
There is also some argument that the UFC’s labor market foreclosure has
damaged competition in the MMA Promotional Market. This argument
proceeds by claiming that the UFC’s dominance in the labor market and use
of non-compete contracts harms competition by preventing other would–be
employers from hiring top-thirty fighters and, thereby, prevents other MMA
promotions from competing effectively for viewership.266 Competition is
injured by foreclosure when “potential competitors [are prevented] from
gaining a foothold in the market by exclusionary conduct.”267 However, in
the context of the UFC and Zuffa, this argument is without merit because the
harm is entirely to competitors, not competition and “[i]t can’t be said often
enough that the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors.”268
While the UFC’s competitors in the promotional market are certainly harmed
by this practice, the evidence suggests that the UFC’s behavior in the MMA
Promotional Market is procompetitive.269 Further, there is no basis for a
claim that competitors have been prevented from gaining a foothold in the
MMA Promotional Market. Bellator and ONE FC are companies which
have a foothold and compete with the UFC in the MMA Promotional Market.
Therefore, competitors have not been prevented from gaining a foothold in
the market and the competitive harm appears to be entirely in the Elite MMA
Labor Market as a result of the Reebok Deal.

mmajunkie.com/2016/08/fc-202-salaries-conor-mcgregor-pulls-in-record-3-millionpurse-nate-diaz-gets-2-million-1.
263. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898).
264. Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 622-23 (8th Cir. 1976).
265. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282.
266. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 1990.
267. United States v. Dentsply, 399 F.3d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 159 (3d Cir. 2003)).
268. Id. at 188.
269. See supra Figures 1, 2, 3, & 4.
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IV. NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE MMA INDUSTRY
Although UFC fighters have been harmed by the organization’s business
practices, no regulatory agency is likely to come to their aid. Therefore, UFC
fighters must protect themselves from unfair business practices by doing one
or both of two things: (1) acquire collective bargaining power through an
association or union; and (2) lobbying for the expansion of the Ali Act270 to
cover MMA.271 The heart of the issue for MMA fighters is lack of bargaining
power,272 which can be remedied by unionization and collective bargaining,
and lack of access to revenue data for use in contractual negotiations,273
which can be remedied by expansion of the Ali Act.
Federal agencies are unlikely to interfere with the UFC’s business
practices because there is no indication that consumers have been harmed.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) rarely acts in such circumstances
as the antitrust and competition preservation policies are geared toward
protecting consumers.274 Further, the FTC’s Bureau of Competition
investigated the UFC in 2012 following the Strikeforce acquisition and
concluded that “no further action is warranted and the investigation is now
closed.”275
Two fighters associations have already begun the unionization process:
the Mixed Martial Arts Athletes Association (“MMAAA”)276 and the
Professional Fighters Association (“PFA”).277 Further, several of the UFC’s
highest level fighters have recently formed the MMAAA.278 Fighters joining
any of these organizations would likely lead to the formation of a bilateral
cartel between the fighter’s association and the UFC. While some problems
do come with unionization, the benefits of collective bargaining outweigh
270. 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012).
271. Rob Maysey, Battle Lines Being Drawn: Why the Muhammad Ali Act Should

Apply to MMA, MMAFA (July 1, 2008), http://mmafa.tv/battle-lines-being-drawn-why
-the-muhammad-ali-act-should-apply-to-mma/.
272. Snowden, supra note 200.
273. Id.; see also Abhinay Muthoo, The Economics of Bargaining, UNIV. OF
WARWICK 25 (2017), https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/amuthoo/
publications/unesco.pdf (explaining how asymmetric information in bargaining
situations works to the disadvantage of the party lacking information).
274. Gift, supra note 155.
275. Luke Thomas, Federal Trade Commission Ends Second Investigation of UFC,
MMA FIGHTING (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.mmafighting.com/2015/11/24/9796478/
federal-trade-commission-ends-second-investigation-of-ufc.
276. See MMAFA Mission Statement, MMAFA, http://mmafa.tv/about-mmafa/ (last
visited Sept. 30, 2011).
277. See PROF’L FIGHTERS ASS’N, profighters.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
278. Brett Okamoto, UFC Fighters Form Mixed Martial Arts Athletes Association,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/ufc-fighters-form-mixedmartial-arts-athletes-association/story?id=43889432.
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the detriments. That said, some of the problems with unionization are not
present in the formation of an association; namely, a union’s vulnerability to
challenges based on fighters’ status as independent contractors rather than
employees.279 The ability to set minimum contractual requirements in favor
of the fighters would prevent coercive contracting and give the fighters a seat
at the negotiation table whenever a major change is considered for the sport.
This would prevent events like the UFC’s Reebok Deal.280 When the deal
was made, fighters did not have any say in the matter and the result was
untold losses in fighter income.281 A MMA fighters’ union would be able to
use its ability to bargain collectively and prevent such deals happening in the
future without the fighters’ consent.
MMA fighters are far from the first athletes to be exploited by a dominant
firm. Athletes within tennis, NASCAR, and boxing have all been injured by
anticompetitive business practices by their governing bodies; each group of
athletic competitors has reacted differently.282 Tennis reacted by forming a
players association through which effectively took the place of promoters in
the sport.283 Stock car racers have effectively submitted to the sport’s
governing body, the National Association of Stock Car Auto Racing
(“NASCAR”), and accepted the resulting bargaining positions as the status
quo.284 Boxing, the sport most comparable to MMA, has seen the benefit of
legislative action in the form of the Ali Act.285 The MMAAA and the PFA
279. See id. (clarifying the UFC fighters are not employees, but are rather independent contractors that do not receive many of the labor and employment benefits of federal
employment laws including protections for unions).
280. Brennan, supra note 166.
281. Guilherme Cruz, Vitor Belfort Says He Lost “Millions of Dollars” with UFC–
Reebok Deal, But Free Agency Isn’t the Solution, MMA FIGHTING (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://www.mmafighting.com/2016/3/30/11327066/vitor-belfort-says-he-lost-millionsof-dollars-with-ufc-reebok-deal; Jesse Holland, Brendan Schaub Loses Six Sponsors
Following Announcement of UFC Deal With Reebok, MMA MANIA (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.mmamania.com/2014/12/9/7361523/brendan-schaub-loses-six-sponsorsfollowing-announcement-ufc-reebok-uniforms-mma.
282. S. Joseph Modric, The Good Ole’ Boys: Antitrust Issues in America’s Largest
Spectator Sports, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 156, 170–71 (2003)
(outlining the antitrust issues in the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing and
how participants have reacted to the issue); Jonathan Snowden, Combating the UFC
Monopoly: Tennis as a Model for Organizing Fighters, BLOODY ELBOW (Mar. 16, 2011,
7:29
PM),
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2011/3/16/2053887/combating-the-ufcmonopoly-tennis-as-a-model-for-organizing-fighters (proposing that MMA fighters
follow the lead of tennis players who faced many of the problems MMA fighters do
currently).
283. History, ATP WORLD TOUR, http://www.atpworldtour.com/en/corporate/history
(last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
284. See Ky. Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, Inc., 588 F.3d 908, 914, 920–21 (6th Cir.
2009).
285. 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012).
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are both currently lobbying for the expansion of the Ali Act to cover
MMA.286
Congress passed the Ali Act in 2000, an amendment to the Professional
Boxing Safety Act of 1996,287 with the intent to prevent the anticompetitive
and unfair business practices which were common in the boxing industry.288
Legislation has been introduced in Congress to expand the Ali Act to
MMA.289 Expansion of the Ali Act to MMA would entail three main changes
to the sport: (1) third party organization(s) controlling the fighter ranking
system, thereby preventing conflicts of interest and manipulation; (2)
revenue transparency; and (3) make coercive contracting clauses
unenforceable.290 The only parts of the Ali Act which should be expanded
to cover MMA are the formation of third party ranking committees and
mandating revenue transparency. Rather than expand the enforceability of
contracts clauses to cover MMA, the fighters should join one of these unions
and negotiate for more favorable contracts.
The UFC’s control over the ranking system has been used as a coercive
tool during contractual negotiations.291 Such practices were once common
in boxing and are being used in MMA to push fighters into unfavorable
contracts.292 Formation of an independent rankings committee would
increase the likelihood that rankings are objective and based on fighter skills
and accomplishments rather than what is expedient for the UFC. This area
of the Ali Act has been effective in the boxing industry and would likely
work just as well in MMA.293 The Ali Act ensures compliance with rankings
provisions by preventing promoters from receiving the revenue from events:
286. See Brett Okamoto, Ali Amendment Could Expand Federal Law’s Coverage To
MMA, ESPN (May 19, 2016), http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/15589773/bill-aim
s-expand-muhammad-ali-boxing-reform-act-mma.
287. 15 U.S.C. § 6301.
288. H.R. REP. NO. 106-449, pt. 1 at 1, 7–8 (1999), as reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.
A.N. 329.
289. H.R. 5365, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
290. Nash, supra note 142.
291. Ben Fowlkes, With Ali Act, A Long Battle for MMA’s Future is Just Beginning,
MMA JUNKIE (June 14, 2016, 12:45 PM), http://mmajunkie.com/2016/06/with-ali-acta-long-battle-for-mmas-future-is-just-beginning (detailing the UFC’s coercive negotiation tactic of removing fighters from official rankings and thereby reducing the
fighter’s contracting value during difficult negotiations).
292. See generally Scott Baglio, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: The
First Jab at Establishing Credibility in Professional Boxing, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257,
2268–69 (2000) (emphasizing and explaining the contractual abuses in the box-ing
industry).
293. Lydia De Pillis, The Battle to Protect Fighters in the Fastest Growing, Least–
Regulated Sport in America, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/business/economy/the-battle-to-protect-fighters-in-the-fastest-growing-leastregulated-sport-in-america/2016/04/22/b9484fe0-fc21-11e5-886f-
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[U]ntil, with respect to a change in the rating of a boxer
previously rated by such organization in the top 10 boxers
the organization–(1) posts a copy, within 7 days of such
change, on its Internet website or home page, if any,
including an explanation of such change, for a period of not
less than 30 days; and (2) provides a copy of the rating
change and explanation to an association to which at least a
majority of the State boxing commissions belong.294
Within the sports industry, almost every organization discloses revenue
other than the UFC.295 The purpose of revenue disclosures is to allow
athletes the same access to information as the promotion. Revenue
disclosures would allow fighters to see how much money the promoters
make from their fights and likely lead to increased fighter wages. The UFC
distributes a smaller percentage of revenue to its athletes than any other
major sports organization.296 Disclosure of revenue would balance the scales
between the UFC and its fighters while negotiating and resolve much of the
controversy surrounding the UFC’s treatment of its fighters by making the
bargaining positions between the fighters and the UFC more equal.
The Ali Act’s provisions regarding enforceability of coercive contracts
should not be expanded to cover MMA because these provisions have not
been effective in the boxing industry and there is no indication that they
would be any more effective in the MMA industry. These provisions were
included in the Ali Act because boxers were commonly coerced into
unfavorable contracts which gave the promoters an unreasonable amount of
power over the boxer’s life and career. Although the unenforceability
provisions were well intended, they have never been effective because they
have never been enforced.297 The problem with the enforcement provisions
is that, although section 6309(b)(3) grants the United States Attorney
General the power to “bring a civil action against any individual who is
reasonably believed to be in violation of any provision of the Ali Act,”298 the
provision also provides that “[n]othing in this chapter authorizes the
enforcement of any provision of this chapter against the Federal Trade
Commission, the United States Attorney General, or the chief legal officer
. . . for . . . failing to act in an official capacity.”299 In other words, the
a037dba38301_story.html.
294. 15 U.S.C. § 6307c(c) (2012).
295. See, e.g., Which Professional Sports Leagues Make the Most Money?, HOW
MUCH, https://howmuch.net/articles/sports-leagues-by-revenue (last visited Nov. 16,
2016).
296. Snowden, supra note 200.
297. Ehrlichman, supra note 143, at 439–40.
298. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(b)(3).
299. Id. § 6309(e)(1).
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enforcing body is not required to enforce this area of law and, more
importantly, the enforcing bodies in fact do not enforce the Ali Act.300 The
state boxing commissions “are most likely not equipped to enforce the Ali
Act” for those states that have boxing commissions, “are understaffed and
under-funded.”301 Unfortunately, these provisions have been hamstrung by
lack of funding and Congressional disinterest in remedying the issue.302
Boxers are also authorized to bring civil actions “in the appropriate Federal
or State court and recover damages suffered,”303 but there are issues with this
provision as well. Due to the resources consumed and length of litigation,304
fighters are often unable to pursue their chosen career while participating in
litigation against coercive contracts. As a result, fighters are likely to accept
an unfair (and possibly illegal) contracts if it means they are able to pursue
the dream of a title belt, even if the fighter’s chances of retaining a title belt
are little more than a pipe-dream.
CONCLUSION
The UFC is responsible for the incredible growth rate in the MMA
industry and has increased the competitiveness of the MMA Promotional
Market by immeasurable proportions. However, the UFC has accomplished
this feat, in part, through behavior injurious to its labor market, MMA
fighters. The best course of action for MMA fighters to halt this injurious
behavior is to unionize, lobby for the expansion of the Ali Act to cover
MMA, and insist on fairness in contractual negotiations and the resulting
obligations.

300. But see Baglio, supra note 292, at 2284–85 (analyzing the potential positive
effects of the Ali Act, but overlooking the fact that enforcement clauses are ineffective
without funding for enforcement personnel).
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302. See, e.g., S. 275, 108th Cong. (2004) (federal legislation to provide funding for
Ali Act enforcement has been introduced repeatedly since 2002 and never voted on).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d).
304. See, e.g., Le v. Zuffa, No. 2:15cv–01045–RFB–PAL, 2016 WL 6134520, at *2
(D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2016) (an antitrust lawsuit against the UFC that began in 2014 and is
both still active and appears far from over as of November 2016).

